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Abstract  The closed systems nature of neoclassical models of economic growth –
guaranteeing automatic equality between planned savings and investment which, in turn, 
ensures stability of such models – is achieved by assuming away the existence of 
uncertainty inherent in economic systems. Once the role of Keynesian uncertainty is 
acknowledged, the assumption of automatic equality between ex-post savings and ex-ante 
investment becomes untenable. This paper attempts to show that once this possibility of 
planned savings and investment inequality is incorporated in an otherwise essentially 
neoclassical model of economic growth, its closed system nature disappears and the 
model metamorphoses itself into an open system. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to take a look at growth theory in terms of whether or 
not it is developed as a closed or open system. We then suggest that the system 
underlying the Keynesian and post-Keynesian models of economic growth are open 
systems contrasted with the neoclassical growth models, which are presented and 
analysed in a closed system environment. What the paper attempts to show is that, in the 
presence of Keynesian uncertainty and the possibility of planned saving and investment 
inequality, the economic system can only be represented as an open system. 
 
In Section 2, we introduce the concept of open system which is the basis of the 
rest of the paper. Section 3 presents, following Sen (1970), a description of the 
reappearance of Harrodian instability in a neoclassical growth model, with a Cobb-
Douglas production function, in the presence of an independent investment function. 
Section 4 presents the role of history in the production function underlying Klador’s 
technical progress function. Finally, Section 5 presents the concluding observations. 
2. Open systems 
We start with the observation, ‘(a)n open system, ……….has interactions with the 
outside world. In the real world instances of perfect isolations are rare’ (Chick, 2004: 5) 
following on to, ‘(i)t is quite clear that not only are all parts of the economic system 
interconnected to a greater or lesser degree but the economic system is embedded in and 
connected with politics, philosophy, history, values, all the elements of social life. 
Ontologically then, the economy is unequivocally an open system.’(Chick, 2004:.5). 
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Since the elements of social life go through many changes and transformations over time, 
their interaction with it implies that the underlying economic system (or economic 
structure, if you prefer) will also undergo many changes as time passes. The arguments 
presented in this paper are based upon the understanding of an economy as an open 
system, where the nature of an open system is as outlined in the above quotations from 
Chick (2004) 
In the growing crop of recent literature on the nature of economic systems and 
definition of open and closed systems, one may, perhaps, be forgiven for having a 
sensation not far removed from that of a blind person trying to ‘see’ an elephant. It 
depends on the viewer’s perspective. For the most comprehensive definition of open and 
closed systems please see Chick and Dow (2005). However, judging by the conditions for 
open systems as presented in Table 1 of Chick and Dow (2005), any one of which can 
make the system open, we can conclude that these conditions, both for the ‘real world 
systems’ and their ‘implications for theoretical systems’ can be seen to be satisfied in the 
post-Keynesian models of economic growth. With reference to Tables 1 and 2 in Chick 
and Dow, one may argue that when, once a closed system is specified, it starts to run on 
auto pilot. This we observe in neoclassical models of economic growth. The system 
always converges to equilibrium and any disequilibrium gets automatically corrected 
without interventions from outside. Also, any change in the system is imposed from 
outside as technological progress in the form of exogenously determined manna from 
heaven.  In the context of growth economics, an open system is interpreted as the account 
of the economic system as in the first three chapters of the Wealth of Nations in the sense 
described by Kaldor (1972: Section II). Following the spirit of Kaldor and Allyn Young, 
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in an open system ,’the actual state of an economy during any one ‘period’ cannot be 
predicted except as a result of the sequence of events in previous periods which led up to 
it.’(Kaldor, 1972: 1244). 
In closed systems like the neoclassical general equilibrium system, history or 
social interactions do not matter. As Kaldor (1972) writes, ‘(t)he very notion of ‘general 
equilibrium’ carries the implication that it is legitimate to assume that the operation of 
economic forces operate in an environment that is ‘imposed’ on the system in a sense 
other than being just a heritage of the past – one could almost say an environment which 
in its most significant characteristics is independent of history.’ (Kaldor, 1972:.1244). He 
then goes on to observe (in the same paragraph) that ‘Continuous economic change on 
these assumptions can only be conceived as some kind of ‘moving equilibrium’ through 
the postulate of an autonomous (and unexplained) time rate of change in the exogenous 
variables of a kind that is consistent with ‘continuous equilibrium’ through time…’.  
One of the main objections made by Kaldor is to the underlying assumption of the 
general equilibrium analysis of the automatic equality between planned saving and 
investment. He pointed out that Keynes postulated that ‘…in one particular market, the 
market for savings, the price is not, or need not be, ‘market clearing’ (owing to liquidity 
preference), and if it is not, there is another mechanism that of the multiplier, to bring 
about equality in that market …..But that mechanism operates by varying the amount of 
production in general. It leads to a situation that is not resource constrained.’ (Kaldor, 
1975: 350; emphasis and parentheses in the original). Looked at from this point of view, 
the condition which is relevant for our discussion relates to the assumption of the 
economic agents behaviour in the post-Keynesian and neoclassical growth models.  
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In an open system, agents and their interactions may change and the structure and 
agency are interdependent. In closed systems, the nature of atomistic economic agents is 
treated as if constant (Chick and Dow, 2005: 366-367).  Such an assumption of agents’ 
behaviour is what guarantees equality between planned savings and investment. In the 
context of Keynesian uncertainty, however, an assumption of economic agents running 
on an ‘auto pilot’ is hard to justify. Planned saving need not and does not equalise with 
planned investment all the time. This paper concentrates on the implication of planned 
saving and investment inequality in models of economic growth. 
3. Stability problem due to Harrod 
We start from, what is known in the literature as, the First Harrod Problem – that 
although steady state growth at full employment is possible in a model of economic 
growth, such a ‘Golden Age’ (Robinson, 1969: 99-100) is highly improbable. The steady 
state growth with full employment implies equality of the actual rate of growth Ga, 
warranted rate of growth, Gw, (defined as ‘that overall rate of advance which, if executed, 
will leave entrepreneurs in a state of mind in which they will be prepared to carry on a 
similar advance’ Harrod (1948: 82)) and the natural rate of growth Gn (the rate of growth 
of labour). What is the reason behind attainment of such Golden Age being highly 
improbable? We know that Ga is the ratio between the marginal propensity to save (s), 
and the actual capital-output ratio (v) and Gw is the ratio between the marginal propensity 
to save and vr the capita-output ration required by the entrepreneurs. Now s, v (and vr) as 
well as the natural rate of growth, Gn are all determined independent of each other. For 
this reason steady-state rate of growth with full employment can only be attained through 
some happy accident. The First Harrod Problem is only the first step towards the more 
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serious Second Harrod Problem which Harrod regarded as his main theme. The Second 
Harrod Problem states that the warranted rate of growth is fundamentally unstable in the 
sense that divergence of actual rate of growth, Ga, from the warranted rate, Gw, is not 
only not self-correcting but, left to itself, would produce even larger divergences over 
time (Harrod, 1948).  
Solow (1956) proposed a way out of the problem of instability one encounters in 
the model of economic growth due to Harrod. Solow claimed that the Harrod-Domar1 
model studied long run behaviour of the economy, which is the domain of neoclassical 
analysis (‘the land of margin’), with tools of short run analysis such as the multiplier, 
accelerator and fixed capital coefficient. He proposed a ‘model of long-run growth which 
accepts all the Harrod-Domar assumptions except that of fixed proportions’ (Solow, 
1956:162; emphasis added). In this model Solow could demonstrate that the steady state 
growth with full employment can be achieved in a model of economic growth, 
constructed using the neoclassical general equilibrium methodology. 
However, Solow (1956) implicitly assumed away existence of uncertainty as 
presented by equation 1 of his model, as well as his arguments leading up to the equation, 
that savings – a proportion of income, is always equal to the investment at every instant 
of time. This assumption of investment as an accommodating variable along with that of 
a flexible capital-labour ratio and an exogenously given rate of growth of labour 
guaranteed long run stable equilibrium. Not surprisingly, growth in this general 
equilibrium model comes from the exogenously determined rate of growth of the 
efficiency of labour. As Hahn and Matthews (1964:789-790) have pointed out, ‘In its 
                                                 




basic form the neo-classical model depends on the assumption that it is always possible 
and consistent with equilibrium that investment should be undertaken of an amount equal 
to full-employment savings. The mechanism that ensures this is as a rule not specified.’  
The rate of interest that ensures planned investment is equal to full employment saving is 
adjusted in one of the three possible interventions: (a) through the operation of Say’s 
Law, in the absence of money or when demand for money is interest inelastic; (b) 
through adjustment of the price level to influence the rate of interest via its effect on the 
real money balances or (c) through the use of appropriate monetary policy (Hahn and 
Matthews, 1964, p.790). The last of these three options is due to Meade (1961). The 
implication of this policy suggestion, due to Meade, is that there has to be some form of 
intervention by the monetary authorities to ensure the stability of the neoclassical models 
of economic growth. The implication of this last observation is that the neoclassical 
growth model can no longer be considered as a closed system. Otherwise, following 
Hahn and Matthews (1964:790), ‘The familiar Keynesian difficulties therefore arise….’ 
Commenting on the instability problem due to Harrod Joan Robinson (1961:360) 
pointed out that: 
‘As the statement of ex ante equilibrium conditions, it (the familiar formula g = 
s/v) fails to isolate independent variables; s, the ratio of annual net saving to 
annual net income, is strongly influenced by the ratio of profits to income, which 
in turn is strongly influenced by the ratio of annual net investment to the value of 
capital, that is, by g itself; v, the ratio of value of capital to annual net income, is 
influenced both through the prices of capital goods and through the choice of 
technique, by the ratio of profit, which is a function of s and g. All the formula 
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can say is that, if growth is going on under equilibrium conditions at the rate g, 
then s/v is equal to it.’ (emphasis added). 
She went on to add: 
‘Harrod…….. did not want to throw away the General Theory and make savings 
govern investment…What he shows is that, if we write down a function for the 
inducement to invest (whether in terms of the accelerator, or of expected profits, 
of the supply of finance, or just of the animal spirits of the managers of firms) 
generating a desired rate of growth, and a set of identical conditions (the labour 
supply, the flow of new investment and so forth) providing a ‘natural’ or better, a 
physically possible rate of growth, and, furthermore, postulate equilibrium with 
full employment, we have overdetermined our system.’ (Robinson, 1961:360-61). 
What are the ways out of this problem of an overdetermined system? Robinson (1961) 
suggested three ways out; 
(i) Give up the idea of equilibrium and exhibit an economy blundering on from 
one situation to another (as happens in the history of the world we live in) 
following no simple predictable path. In other words, learn to live with the 
problem envisaged by Harrod. 
(ii) Introduce a functional connection between the desired and the possible growth 
rate so that the one determines the other 
(iii) Give up the desired rate of growth and simply assume that actual growth goes 
on, in equilibrium conditions, with continuous full employment of available 
labour  
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Solow (1956) is the neoclassical ‘solution’; the way out (iii) in the list above. In 
other words, the assumption of savings and investment equality leaves out the role of 
the expected rate of growth completely and consequently, the role of the ‘animal 
spirits’ of entrepreneurs which guides investment decisions. Thus, there is no role for 
an independent investment function in the neoclassical growth models. Investment is 
always equal to saving which then leads to the familiar formula g = s/v.  
What will happen if we reintroduce the role of an independent investment 
function in a neoclassical growth model while retaining all the other assumptions of the 
model – constant returns to the scale, a smooth twice-differentiable production function 
that satisfies the Inada conditions (Inada, 1964), the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution as well as the flexible capital labour ratio? Sen (1970) did just that. He 
started  with the well behaved neoclassical production function  
αα −= 1LKeY mt             (3.1) 
(where, Y, K and L stand for output, capital and labour respectively.) 




Y =   )1.3( ′  




δ  or marginal 
productivity of capital. Since r and α are given, Y and K must grow at the same 
proportional rate. Therefore Harrod’s warranted rate, Gw = s/v, turns out to be 
α
rsGw =        (3.2) 
Sen (1970) then introduced an independent investment function based on an expected rate 
of growth, which is not necessarily equal to the warranted rate. A set of neoclassical 
 10
entrepreneurs, given the expected (exponential) rate of growth of j over time plan to 
invest enough to make an expected rate of profit equal to the own rate of interest.  




eYr α=        (3.3) 














α== 1       (3.4) 
But from (3.2) α
rsG w =  
So if α
rsj =  (i.e., expected rate = warranted rate) actual income is equal to the expected 
income. Let the actual rate of growth is given by Gtt eYY = . Now, if α
rsj >  we have 
aGj <  and if α
rsj <  we have aGj >  
Thus, in whatever direction one might err in, one would feel that the error lies in the other 
direction causing the second Harrod problem to come back.  
Before we end this section, it will be interesting to point out that Solow himself 
was not completely unaware of the possibility that investment may not always be an 
accommodating variable. In a small section, entitled ‘Uncertainty etc.’, at the end of his 
1956 article he wrote: 
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 ‘No credible theory of investment can be built on the assumption of perfect 
foresight and arbitrage over time. There are only too many reasons why net 
investment should be at times insensitive to current changes in the real return to 
capital, at other times oversensitive. All these cobwebs and some others have been 
brushed aside throughout this essay. In the context, this is perhaps justifiable.’ 
(Solow, 1956:93-94; emphasis added).  
It would be interesting to speculate about the ‘context’ which ‘justifies’ these ‘cobwebs’ 
to ‘be brushed aside’ 
 
4. Kaldor’s technical progress function 
Kaldor (1957) introduced the concept of technical progress function, which is a 
relationship which incorporates both shift of and movement along a production function. 
The technical progress function ‘permits the desired rate of growth to bring the possible 
rate into equality with itself’ (Robinson, 1961:361). The general form of the technical 








y &&     0,0 <′′>′ ff   (4.1) 





y &&        )1.4( ′  
This choice of the linear form created some unnecessary confusion and, for a time 
caused attention to be diverted away from the true nature of the technical progress 
function in (4.1). Black (1962) integrated )1.4( ′  and, not surprisingly, got a Cobb-
Douglas production function complete with manna from heaven shift factor. Solow 
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(1967) was the first to point out that in considering (4.1) above one should not ignore the 
history (i.e. path of) capital accumulation. Writing (4.1) in difference equation form and 










kgyy   i =1,2,…..,t 
which captures the history of capital accumulation up to the current period in determining 
the level of production at any given period. 
It can be shown (Ghosh, 1985; Ghosh and Banerjee, 1993) that the history of 
capital accumulation becomes relevant when investment plans are not realised in the 
sense that when planned investment )( PI  is not equal to planned savings )( PS . 
Following Stein (1969) they wrote that under situation like this the actual investment 
)( aI can be represented as a convex combination of planned investment and planned 
savings. This can be written as: 
,)1( PPa SII Ω−+Ω=                  10 <Ω<    (4.2) 
Here Ω  is a constant which reflects the institutional framework. When Ω =1, means that 
both savings and investment plans in the society has been realised. Remembering 













y PPP&&    (4.3) 
Here, YsS PP =  and n is the natural rate of growth. It is to be noted that both Ps and v 
has a time dimension. 
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Upon integration (4.3) gives us2 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ Ω−+= ∫Ω t P dttv tstAkty 0 )( )(exp)( ααφα    (4.4) 
Where A is a constant of integration and )1( Ω−−= αβφ n .  
The expression under the integral sign provides the history of economic growth from the 
initial period to the present time. When 1=Ω , in other words when planned investment is 
equal to planned savings we get from (4.4): 
αφ kAety t′=)(         (4.5) 
where βφ =′  
which is the familiar Cobb-Douglas production function. 
That the sufficient condition for (4.4) to collapse to a C-D production function when 
1=Ω  is obvious. However, what is the sufficient condition for this to happen? The 








ts P  to be constant. Since α is assumed to be a constant from the 
beginning, assuming further that Ω  is also a constant but not necessarily equal to unity, 
the condition then becomes =
v
s P  constant. This, however, is a familiar condition which 
is the simple equilibrium relation – n
v
s = . As Pasinetti (1974:125-126) pointed out, this 
equilibrium condition simply states that if s and n are constant, the equilibrium output 
                                                 
2 It is to be noted that since pk& is small compared to the existing stock of capital k(t)., integration of 
k
k p&
with respect to t can be written as log k(t) without any loss of generality. 
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capital ratio, if it exists, is determined by the natural rate of growth divided by the over-all 
propensity to save independently of anything else and therefore, independent of the shape 
of the production function. 
We now have the condition that if the economy is in equilibrium then n
v
s P =  
implies that equation (4.4) collapses to equation (4.5). However, when the economy is in 
growth equilibrium all relevant variables grow at the same rate. This, in turn, implies that 
all plans, including savings and investment plans, are realised; which means 1=Ω . Thus 
1=Ω is both the necessary and sufficient condition for the production function 
underlying the technical progress function to collapse in to a C-D production function. 
However, if the economy is not in growth equilibrium, the whole history of capital 
accumulation, i.e., the expression under the integral sign in (4.4), becomes relevant for 
the determination of the level of income at any given time period. In other words, when 
all variables are growing at the same constant rate over time the economic system can be 
represented by any system including a closed system. However, outside equilibrium, 
where history, politics, socio economic policies shape agents’ behaviour it is only an 
open system which can represent a true description of the economic system. 
Kaldor himself ‘always wanted to give the technical progress function a 
“disequilibrium interpretation”’ though he by no means agreed that an underlying 
production function must necessarily exist.3 The purpose of our exercise in this section, 
however, was not to search for the existence of a production function underlying the 
technical progress function. Our objective was to demonstrate that in the presence of 
                                                 
   Kaldor’s personal communication, available from the author on request 3  Kaldor’s personal 
communication, available from the author on request 
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uncertainty and hence the absence of automatic equality between savings and investment, 
the technical progress function demonstrates the role of initial condition as well as past 
history in determination of economic growth. 
5. Conclusions 
Srinivasan (1985: 40) while describing the two theorems of welfare economics, 
that (i) a competitive equilibrium is a Pareto optimum and (ii) associated with any Pareto 
optimum is set of prices that will sustain it as competitive equilibrium, observed that ‘(a) 
curious facet of this neoclassical gem is that it is ‘institution free’ in that it does not 
explicitly refer to any state’. If this world view is accepted one can find very little 
justification for analysing an economy from an open systems perspective. However, this 
claim of a system being institution free begs the question, can such systems represent the 
reality of economic life in general and that of economic growth in particular. Above, we 
have demonstrated that even in an economic model where we start with the iconic well 
behaved Cobb-Douglas production function and borrow all the mathematical techniques 
from the rulebook of the neoclassical economics, the closed system nature of the 
neoclassical general equilibrium world disappear as soon as, following Keynes, we 
recognise that planned saving and investment in an economy are not necessarily always 
in equilibrium. In a world of liquidity preference, where perfect certainty is not the order 
of the day, where entrepreneurs speculate – in other words, where uncertainty rules, we 
would expect saving and investment to diverge and that is when the true nature of the real 
world economic system – an open system – becomes obvious. 
The discussion above may lead to the question – is the disequilibrium nature of 
the economy presented in sections 3 and 4 are coincidental. The answer is ‘probably not’. 
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As it has been observed ‘(c)losure precludes openness to history and creativity. Open 
systems are path-dependent and non-ergodic and may exhibit neither event regularities 
nor unique equilibrium.’ (Chick, 1998:1856).  
As Loasby (2003: 294) has suggested, rather than contrasting openness and 
closure, it is more fruitful to think in terms of dimensions and degrees of closure. He 
observes that “(c)ompletely closed models are obviously limiting cases in terms of 
degree, but human cognitive powers requires a drastic restriction on the number of 
dimensions in order to secure closure – as is illustrated by the practice of economists. 
Partial closure is necessary for any exploration of openness: we have to close our minds 
to many possibilities in order to pay attention to a few ….Routines, institutions, 
organizational design and the acceptance of authoritative pronouncements – only a small 
proportion of them from normal superiors – all contribute to such closures” (Loasby, 
2003: 294). If the neoclassical world view that economic systems can be analysed as 
closed systems is accepted, are there any roles for the policy makers in economics? The 
logic of the closed systems leads to the conclusion that once the equilibrium is achieved 
in such a system (which, in any case, is automatic) it can be left to run on auto-pilot given 
that the system is inherently stable. The role of policy interventions becomes relevant 
only in the context of open systems. In context of the Post-Keynesian models of 
economic growth, as with the passage of time these routines, institutions, organisational 
design etc change, the connections within a closed system changes and demands another 
(temporary) closure for the policy makers to work on. Only open systems can 
accommodate uncertainty, structural social and sociological changes and hence their 
impacts on the economic system and the implications of such uncertainty and changes for 
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economic policy making and in the words of Joan Robinson (quoted in section 3 above) 
‘(g)ive up the idea of equilibrium and exhibit an economy blundering on from one 
situation to another (as happens in the history of the world we live in) following no 
simple predictable path.’. In other words, move from one temporarily closed system to 
another one which becomes more relevant for analysing the economy at that specific 
period of time given the nature of technological progress, social and sociological 
conditions and expectations prevailing at that particular point in history. 
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